A One-note “strategy”? Mr. Harper Goes to Latin America

What message is Canada sending to Latin America? And what does Prime Minister Harper’s visit to the region in August tell us about the state of Canada’s “Americas Strategy”?

When first announced by Mr. Harper in July 2007, the Americas Strategy promised to make Latin America and the Caribbean a top priority for Canadian foreign policy, and committed Canada to playing a “bigger role in the Americas… for the long term.” The three priorities established in the Strategy were to promote democratic governance, prosperity, and security in the region.
Since the strategy was announced, supporters of stronger Canadian engagement with the Americas have signalled their disappointment with Foreign Affairs’ lack of sustained attention to the region. An expected strategy document that might have laid out a more visionary approach apparently stalled in Cabinet and was never released. A recent internal evaluation done by the Office of the Inspector General in Foreign Affairs and obtained by Canadian Press under access-to-information legislation found that the strategy had suffered for lack of funds, focus, and co-ordination.

In the absence of a clear, comprehensive strategy, we were left with a series of flawed trade agreements and the country’s high-profile role in Haiti. The Canadian government signed trade deals with Colombia, a country notorious for high levels of human rights violations, Peru, Costa Rica, and Panama, despite a clear lack of enthusiasm among most Latin Americans for free trade policies. Canada has been pursuing other trade deals, with less success, with the other Central American countries, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and Brazil.

Harper’s six-day trip has reinforced the idea that the government’s real priority is Canadian prosperity, not sustainable development in the region. During the first stop on his trip, he did his best to repair some of the rips in the Canada-Brazil relationship, which has ranged from hostility to indifference in recent years. Canadian exports to Brazil have increased dramatically over the last five years, despite a lacklustre bilateral relationship. Harper and Brazil’s new president, Dilma Rousseff, announced some minor initiatives, like the formation of a Canada-Brazil CEO Forum, and other agreements to boost trade.

Harper next visited Colombia to celebrate the entry into force a week later (August 15th) of the Canada-Colombia free trade agreement. During his trip to Costa Rica, he continued the narrow focus on trade by announcing the decision of the two governments to begin negotiating a new trade agreement dealing with difficult areas not covered in the first agreement, such as government procurement, agriculture, and trade in financial services. Harper and Laura Chinchilla, the Costa Rican president, also committed to increase cooperation in security, tax collection, and air transport. Harper also sent a rather odd message by visiting a hockey rink at a wealthy country club outside of San José that is modelled on a European castle.

Finally, the visit ended on a sour note in Honduras. Harper is the first foreign leader to visit the country since the Organization of American States readmitted the country after its former president, Manuel Zelaya, was overthrown in a military coup. The current government led by Porfirio Lobo came to power in a controversial election, but widespread human rights violations continue. Harper boasted that the deal would help rid the country of poverty and violence: “Trade does, of course, raise people from poverty… Protectionists are selfish and short-sighted in their perspectives”. Meanwhile, demonstrators kept outside the gates at the event begged to differ: they claimed that the deal would contribute to the attack on workers’ rights and line the pockets of Canadian businesses.

In order to win respect in the Americas, the Harper government needs to recognize that there is much more to the relationship than the signing of trade deals which may be perceived as primarily benefitting Canadian corporations. While there well may be benefits to Canada from greater commercial relations with the region, a more sensitive approach is required to address the fact that the image of Canada has become more tarnished in recent years. Canadian companies operating in Latin America, particularly mining companies, have become increasingly the targets of criticism by environmental and human rights organizations and indigenous activists. For example, in May 2011, a delegation from the Wixárika people of northern Mexico presented a letter to the annual shareholders meeting of First Majestic Silver in Vancouver, expressing concerns about the impact the company’s proposed silver mine will have on a sacred site of their people, located in the state of San Luis Potosí. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has ordered the government of Guatemala to suspend operations of Canadian corporation Goldcorp’s Marlin mine to prevent imminent harm to communities living near the mine, an order which the Guatemalan government has failed to comply with. In El Salvador, local human rights organizations charge that deaths of four anti-mining activists are linked to the presence in the region of Vancouver-based Pacific Rim Mining company.
Overall, at a time when Canadian business is increasingly subject to criticism over labour and environmental practices associated with Canadian mining operations, Harper’s trade-focused visit failed to convey the idea that Canada has interests that are higher than the bottom line.

Meanwhile, one country the prime minister missed during his tour was Canada’s “strategic partner” Mexico. Instead, Mexicans had to make do with a visit from foreign minister John Baird, who accompanied Harper on the rest of the tour. The lack of a Mexico stop by Harper seemed to be another snub to our NAFTA partner. Canada’s relationship with Mexico has suffered as a result of the 2009 imposition of the requirement that Mexicans obtain a visa to Canada, and trilateral relations have suffered from the exclusion of Mexico from the recent “perimeter talks” with the United States. Baird and his Mexican counterpart, Patricia Espinosa, discussed such themes as security cooperation, labour mobility, cooperation against transnational organized crime, academic exchanges and scientific cooperation. Baird also told journalists that he had a “significant” discussion about improving security for Canadians visiting Mexico and ensuring effective treatment for cases involving Canadians. None of these discussions signalled that Canada would be taking on a more important role to address security and human rights issues facing Mexicans. Canada could be doing much more to promote democracy, security and human rights in Mexico.

Canada’s “Americas Strategy”:  Why the Americas?  What’s the Strategy?
by Laura Macdonald, Carleton University and Arne Ruckert, University of Ottawa

Text only version

With the electoral victory of Conservative leader Stephen Harper in 2006, Canadian foreign policy makers have again rediscovered Latin America. In various speeches and announcements, Stephen Harper has signaled a renewed interest in the region. In July 2007, during a tour of the Americas, Harper stated that a re-engagement with the Americas would be a top priority of his administration. The focus of the new strategy was to be promotion of economic ties (especially through new free trade agreements), and support for democracy and security in the region. 

The most recent sign of Canada’s tilt toward the Americas is the invitation of three leaders from the Americas – René Préval of Haiti, Bruce Golding of Jamaica and outgoing Colombian president Álvaro Uribe – to join an “outreach” session at the G8 meeting in June.  Traditionally these sessions involve leaders from African countries, and focus on development efforts among the poorest nations on that continent.  Leaders from Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Malawi, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa were also invited, but the invitation of the three heads of state from the Americas signals the Harper government’s shift in strategy.  Préval, Golding and Uribe, all friends of Harper and ideologically compatible, were invited to talk about how the rich countries can help poorer nations deal with security threats like terrorism and organized crimes - not items at the top of the priorities of most developing countries.

This invitation reflects some of the broader problems with Canada’s Americas strategy.  Again, Canada is focusing on a favoured few allies, and shifting the emphasis away from poverty alleviation and Africa, toward Harper’s own priorities – in this case, security.  At the same time, Parliament’s recent approval of the free trade deal with Colombia, despite strong objections from Canadian NGOs and human rights organizations, represents Harper’s other main priority in the Americas – free trade.  In sum, Canada’s recent engagement with the Americas does not adequately respond to the profound changes that have occurred in the Latin American region over the last ten years.  In particular, the heavy focus on the signing of NAFTA-style bilateral or regional free trade and investment agreements with friendly regimes like Colombia shows that the Canadian government remains tied to a neoliberal development model in an era of increased questioning of policies throughout many countries of the Americas.

From Withdrawal to Re-engagement: Canada’s Rediscovery of the Americas

Canada has been on a seemingly never-ending rollercoaster ride in its relations with the hemisphere. Periods of strong engagement have generally been followed by periods of withdrawal from hemispheric activities. The most recent wave of engagement began in the 1990s, after Canada became a permanent member of the OAS.  In the OAS, Canada worked to promote greater attention to democracy in the hemisphere through the establishment of the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy. Canada also played a leading role in the failed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) initiative.  Canada’s and the United States’ unwillingness to accommodate the demands of post-neoliberal regimes in Brazil, Argentina was an important reason for the eventual foundering of the FTAA negotiations. 

However, by the late 1990s the enthusiasm that was driving Canada’s re-engagement had largely waned. There are multiple reasons for this shift: growing global concerns with poverty in Africa, ultimately translating into a stronger focus on Africa within the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA); enhanced security concerns and Canada’s involvement in the US-led ‘War on Terror’; and a serious misalignment between Canadian priorities for the region, such as the FTAA, and the widespread rejection of free market economics among countries of the region.

What, then, explains the Harper government’s new-found enthusiasm for the Americas? Not surprisingly, many commentators attribute Canada’s much-celebrated re-engagement to growing business interests in the region. Canada’s business investments in the Americas are three times higher than investments in Asia, having reached almost CAN$ 100 billion in FDI stocks (assets owned by Canadian multinationals) in 2006. Moreover, trade with Latin America has recently been growing faster than with any other part of the world, with total exports more than doubling from CAN$ 4.17 billion in 2004 to CAN$ 8.68 billion in 2008. The role of business interests as a key driving force behind the foreign policy turn has also been singled out in a volley of speeches and articles by senior policy makers. In a 2007 speech to the House of Commons former foreign minister Maxime Bernier noted that the ultimate goal of the new Americas strategy was to “promote enhanced market access and a level playing field for Canadian businesses” and to “ensure that Canadian business has continued access to this growing market”.

Elements of the “Americas Strategy”

At a practical level, the most obvious aspect of the Canadian government’s Americas strategy to date is the vigorous promotion of bilateral free trade agreements, a move that follows the U.S. example. This emphasis on engaging countries bilaterally represents a significant break from the traditional Canadian foreign policy in the hemisphere which, since Canada joined the OAS demonstrated a strong support for multilateral fora. In contrast, the Harper administration has mainly resorted to bilateral channels to promote neoliberal reforms and, in particular, avoid the stalling of trade and investment liberalization in the wake of the demise of the FTAA. This is part of what DFAIT calls its “aggressive trade negotiation agenda,” aimed at opening the region to Canadian investors and goods (particularly Canadian mining companies) and is in line with Canada’s broader foreign policy objective of deepening Canadian engagement in the Americas, while advancing Canada’s national interests.

In addition to its trade diplomacy, the new strategy also involves an important shift in Canadian aid policy away from a focus on some of the world’s poorest states which are mostly located in Africa. In February 2009, CIDA minister Bev Oda announced the government’s intention to focus on fewer countries than in the past, and to re-concentrate its cooperation efforts on countries in the Americas. The countries selected as focus countries are Bolivia, the Caribbean region, Colombia, Haiti, Honduras, and Peru. Canada has signed trade agreements with Colombia and Peru, neither of which were previously focus countries, while most of the countries that were eliminated from the list are desperately poor countries in Africa.

Overall, the Americas Strategy is dominated by an emphasis on free trade, Canadian corporate interests, and security.  The rise of post-neoliberal governments in the region represents a unique opportunity to avoid some of the contradictions currently present in Canadian foreign policy, especially the simultaneous promotion of human rights and free markets.  Many of these governments are clearly committed to ideals dear to many Canadians, like  multilateralism, reform of institutions of global governance, and poverty alleviation.   By working with these governments, Canada could carve out a clearly independent policy in the region that reflects the values and priorities of the Canadian population and the majority of Latin Americans.

What Canada should do in the Americas:

• Repair the relationship with Mexico, badly damaged by the Harper government’s decision to impose a visa on visiting Mexicans;
• As in Africa, poverty reduction should be the focus of aid spending.  But the Americas should not be the priority in Canada’s aid policy given higher levels of development and lower poverty levels in the region;
• Look for like-minded allies for Canada’s traditional support for multilateralism  and peacebuilding - Brazil is an obvious candidate;
• Consult widely with Canadian and Latin American civil society about future priorities.

Laura Macdonald and Arne Ruckert are co-editors of Post-Neoliberalism in the Americas, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.  Laura Macdonald is a member of the McLeod group.

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Colombia, a focus for increased Canadian trade and – coincidentally, no doubt, a new Canadian aid recipient – struggles with drugs, violence and a North American idea that trade will solve all problems.

Colombia: “free” trade, drugs and thugs            

By John W. Foster

The debate over the proposed Canada-Colombia Free Trade Agreement (FTA) has had many highly charged and some truly strange moments.  Among the most outlandish is the refrain from both Conservative proponents and their Liberal allies that an FTA would help fight the Colombian drug trade.

The recent visit to Canada of Mexican President Felipe Calderon, reminded us we need not look farther than this NAFTA partner of 15 years to expose the absurdity of the argument.  In May President Calderon, told a Monterrey audience that NAFTA had given the “narcos” more power in Mexico.

Remember NAFTA promised to bring Mexican workers and farmers up to the living standards of their counterparts in Canada and the U.S. While a handful of Mexicans have been enriched by the FTA, for the vast majority the dreams faded fast.  Millions of Mexican farmers have been displaced, workers’ wages are far distant from those of their northern counterparts, and the current Calderon government is implicated in nasty attacks on independent trade unions.

In response to the U.S. “war on drugs” in Colombia, the Colombian cartels have cultivated both trade routes and franchise operations in Mexico. And operations in Mexico are growing exponentially. Mexican drug mafias are engaged in murderous competition with each other, spawning a U.S-backed militarization of the Mexican narcotic control operation.  The resulting carnage of murder and mayhem shows no sign of alleviation. The violence even hit U.S. consular employees in March.

The violence and centrality of the drug economy is making Mexico look a lot like Colombia. An estimated 17,000 Mexicans have died in drug-related violence in the last three years. In the border city of Juarez, once touted as the “poster-child” of free trade, more than 4,000 have been killed in two years.

Just how Canada’s bilateral agreement with Colombia might dislocate or reduce the centrality of the drug trade in that economy is unclear and unproven, particularly given the strong inter-linkages between the drug economy and the formal economy. There has been no evidence to back the claims that the trade deal might offer significant alternative economic prospects and employment—though this point might well be investigated as part of a prior independent human rights impact assessment of the trade deal. Such a step was originally agreed by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on International Trade, but is now opposed by Conservatives and Liberals alike.

More likely, further integration with Colombia is likely to reinforce the trends that have undermined peace in Mexico.  The Canada-Colombia FTA has raised concerns about likely increased dislocation among peasant groups, and of sharpened tensions between Canadian investors and communities struggling to retain access to the lands and resources from which they have been displaced, often violently by armed actors.

In recent weeks Afro-Colombian communities in the Cauca region of Colombia have received notice that they are to be forcibly "relocated" off lands they have occupied since the 1600s in a region where the government has given dozens of mining concessions to various multinationals including Canadian mining firms.

Let’s be very clear, the trade in drugs is not going away.  Its economic input to both the Colombian and Mexican economies dwarfs the figure of Canada-Colombian trade with or without an FTA.  Drugs are the second largest source of foreign currency for Mexico, estimated modestly at $30 to $50 billion a year, but as an experienced observer of the Mexican drug scene, U.S. author Charles Bowden notes “no one really knows.” He advises “if President Calderon succeeded in his claimed goal of eradicating the drug industry in Mexico, Mexico would collapse in a minute”. 

If Canadian MPs who have repeatedly expressed their concern about reducing the Colombian drug trade are really serious, they would put their energies not into a bilateral FTA, but into gaining Canada’s support for the February, 2009 call of three former Latin American Presidents (Ernesto Zedillo of Mexico, César Gaviria of Colombia and Fernando Henrique Cardoso of Brazil) for an alternative to the failed “war on drugs”. 

Their approach seeks to reduce market demand in consumer countries like our own, through harm reduction and a public health approach to drug use, decriminalization of possession of cannabis for personal use and a variety of other steps, aimed to cut the economic legs right out from under Colombian and Mexican drug lords and their murderous minions.

As for the Standing Committee, on June 1 the Liberal and Conservative members shut down debate, voting to forward the bilateral trade and investment agreement to the House for approval and implementation. The Conservatives, aided and abetted by ex-Tory Scott Brison were simply not interested in any more evidence from Colombia or Canada. This, the day after Amnesty International Canada reported another round of death threats to trade union, afro-indigenous and NGO personel opposing a gold mine in the Cauca region.  Opponents of the agreement, supporting the NDP’s Peter Julian and allies from the Bloc vow to continue the fight – now more than 14 months long – in the House and the public.

Dr. John W. Foster teaches human rights and globalization at Carleton University and the University of Regina.